




herever one turns these days, one seems to run into comments
about the ﬁnancial condition of the American household. Most
of these comments refer to sources of increasing stress on the
American consumer, from the historically low household savings rate to the
historically high rates of bankruptcy and debt delinquency. On top of all this,
demographic trends are raising the prospect of having to ﬁnance the coming
retirement of the baby boom generation. These conditions have led some
to question the ability of consumer spending to hold up under such growing
ﬁnancial stress. Credit markets and consumers’use of credit products take a
central place in this picture. Stories in the popular business press have taken
the view that consumer debt will represent a drag on consumption growth in
2006, as the burden of making payments on debt limits households’ abilities
to make other purchases.1
Debtandcreditarevalue-ladentermsthatevokedistinctimagesinpeople’s
minds. Indeed, cultural historian Lendol Calder has noted the seemingly
contradictory value judgments that run through American cultural attitudes
about borrowing.2 “Credit” is seen as a good thing, in that it allows the
householdﬁnancialﬂexibilityinmeetingitsconsumptionneeds. Ontheother
hand, “debt” is typically viewed as bad, because it represents a lack of self-
discipline and holds the household hostage to its past choices. And so we
have what appears to be a paradox. The ability to borrow is both liberating
and constraining—a path to both rising wealth and the poorhouse.
This article ﬁrst appeared in the Bank’s 2005 Annual Report. The author is John A. Weinberg,
a Senior Vice President and Director of Research. Kartik Athreya, Ned Prescott, Aaron Steel-
man, and Alex Wolman contributed valuable comments to this article. The views expressed
are those of the author and not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve System.
1An example is “Night of the Living Debt” in the January 4, 2006, Wall Street Journal.
2 See Calder (1999).
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Anotherwaytoviewthisseemingparadoxistothinkof“credit”and“debt”
from two different vantage points. “Credit” typically refers to the moment
when a borrower has access to funds made available by a lender. From this
vantage point, it is a tool to help households achieve their desired levels of
consumption. “Debt,” ontheotherhand, isanafter-the-factconcept, referring
to the amount owed. We see this dichotomy in contemporary discussions of
credit markets. The expansion of access to credit for households previously
thought to be sharply constrained in their ability to borrow is a stated goal
of public policy. On the other hand, the ﬁnancial stress facing some heavily
indebted households is seen by many as a problem requiring a public policy
solution.
This essay explores the use of credit by U.S. households. The ﬁrst section
describes some facts concerning consumer borrowing and its growth in recent
decades. The following sections present some of the economics of household
borrowing, beginning with an explanation of the role of borrowing in helping
a household to meet its consumption goals over time, and then using that
perspective to interpret the facts. This perspective generally does not support
the view that consumer debt causes future weakness in consumption growth
at the macroeconomic level.
This essay’s initial focus is on averages and aggregates, examining trends
in total borrowing by U.S. households and assessing those trends from the
point of view of the typical or average household. While this perspective
is appropriate for thinking about broad trends in credit markets, it can mask
the fact that market changes can have different impacts on different people.
Indeed, these differences are often important to the way people think about
publicpolicytowardcreditmarkets. Alookatmoredisaggregateddata,infact,
revealsthatmuchoftheexpansionofcreditthathasoccurredinrecentdecades
has come in the lower brackets of the income distribution. Accordingly, the
essay will address the question of whether the economics of borrowing by
lower-incomeindividualsissigniﬁcantlydifferentfromthegeneraleconomics
of credit.
1. TRENDS IN CONSUMER CREDIT
How indebted are U.S. consumers? In 2004, the ratio of all consumer debt to
disposable personal income was about 108 percent. The bulk of this debt, 84
percent of income, was in the form of mortgage debt, with the remaining 24
percentinrevolvingandnonrevolvingconsumercredit. Historically,thedebt-
to-income ratio has shown steady growth over much of the last half-century
as is shown in Figure 1. Total debt to income stood at about 35 percent in
1952 and rose to around 50 percent by 1960. It then ﬂuctuated between 55
and 60 percent for much of the 1960s and 1970s, before beginning a sustained
increase in the mid-1980s. But by far the largest share of this growth has beenJ.A. Weinberg: Borrowing by U.S. Households 179
Figure 1 Household Debt Relative to Disposable Personal Income
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in the mortgage portion of household credit, which was 23 percent of income
in 1952. By contrast, nonmortgage consumer credit roughly doubled in this
50-year period, going from 12 to 24 percent.
Asisapparent, averylargepartoftheincreaseinhouseholddebtsincethe
1950shasbeentheriseofmortgagedebt. Tosomeextent,thisriseinmortgage
debt does not represent the typical homeowner borrowing more against the
house that he or she owns. Rather, part of this increase is due to a steadily
risingrateofhomeownership, whichwentfrom55percentofU.S.households
in 1950 to 69 percent in 2005. Another source of this increase is growth in
the value of housing assets owned by consumers. Especially in the 1990s,
the median value of privately owned homes grew faster than median income.
Still, households have generally increased the share of their homeownership
ﬁnanced by mortgage debt.
Growth in the use of credit has been widespread among U.S. households.
While borrowing by households in all income ranges has grown, this growth
hasbeenthemostpronouncedamonghouseholdswithmediumandlowlevels
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between minority and nonminority households, those disparities have tended
to decline. This type of disaggregated information comes primarily from
the Federal Reserve Board’s Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF), which is
conducted every three years. An analysis of trends for households in different
ethnic and income groups was conducted by Raphael Bostic.3 Trends for
people at different income levels are discussed later in this essay.
Does rising debt to income mean that the typical household’s debt bur-
den has risen? The debt burden of a household is usually measured by the
payments on its debts relative to its income. Given the wide variety of terms
on retail credit—from ﬁxed term, ﬁxed interest rate mortgages to open-ended
lines of credit with variable rates—speciﬁcation of the “payments” used to
determine the burden of servicing one’s debts is not straightforward. But the
two main determinants of a household’s repayment obligation are the amount
of debt and the interest rates charged. So, while a precise measurement of the
payment burden would require detailed data on loan characteristics at a very
disaggregated level, it is possible to construct a rough estimate from aggre-
gatedata. DeanMakiprovidesonesuchestimatedtimeseriesoftheaggregate
debt burden of U.S. households.4 For the time period covered in that series,
from 1980 to 2000, the payment burden ﬂuctuates around an average level
of about 13 percent. The debt-service burden tends to rise during expansions
and fall during recessions. This pattern reﬂects two other facts. First, interest
rates tend to rise in expansions and fall in recessions. But, perhaps more im-
portantly, the growth rate of consumer credit is also procyclical, with credit
growing more rapidly in expansions, on average.
The burden households face in servicing their debts, together with the
pattern of growth in those debts, focuses attention on the “credit is good, but
debt is bad” dichotomy. Does the data on household debt suggest more that
“credit” acts a tool for managing consumption growth or that the burden of
“debt” constrains consumption growth, as is suggested in the popular media.
Making this distinction empirically is difﬁcult, since both these forces may be
at work for any given household and the mix may vary considerably across
households. Maki ﬁnds that his debt burden measure does not have strong
predictive power for consumption growth, suggesting that, on average, debt is
not a strong constraining force. In addition, growth in consumer credit tends
to be positively correlated with future consumption growth. This relationship
suggests that credit is an important tool for households in making their con-
sumption choices. How household make those choices is the subject of the
next section.
3 Bostic (2002).
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2. HOW HOUSEHOLDS USE FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS
It is important to view use of credit in the broader context of how a household
chooses to consume and save or borrow over its lifetime. A household’s
ﬁnancial decisions are driven by the fact that its income varies over time.
Broadly speaking, there are two types of variation in income. First, there is
a typical, largely predictable, pattern by which an individual’s income ﬁrst
rises, say from young adulthood into middle age, then falls as the person or
household moves into retirement. But there are also variations in income that
arelesspredictable. Householdsfaceanarrayofshocksthataffecttheirability
to participate and earn income in the labor market. Some of these shocks have
onlytemporaryeffects, likeanillnessthatkeepsaworkeroutoftheworkforce
but from which the worker fully recovers. Others can be more long lasting,
like a permanent decline in demand facing an industry in which a worker has
accumulated a great deal of experience and skill.
Againstthesevariationsinincome, ahouseholdusesﬁnancialservicesre-
lated to saving and borrowing to achieve the best lifetime pattern of consump-
tion possible. What makes one pattern of consumption better than another?
Well, foronething, moreisbetterthanless, soapatternthatgivesahousehold
moreconsumptionofgoodsandservicesateverypointintimeisclearlybetter
than one that gives less. But most comparisons of consumption patterns over
one’s lifetime are not so straightforward. In particular, saving and borrowing
decisions have to do with trading off consumption today for consumption in
the future. So the important point to bear in mind is that household ﬁnancial
decisions are driven not so much by how people feel about having a bigger
savings account or being more in debt as they are by how people feel about
having more consumption today versus more consumption in the future.
One principle for thinking about people’s preferences for consumption
over time and how those preferences affect ﬁnancial decisions is that peo-
ple typically have a preference for smooth consumption—consumption that
doesn’t vary too much over time. In other words, a household that gets a
one-time windfall, like from winning a lottery, for example, will probably
not want to spend it all immediately on consumption of goods and services.
Rather, the lucky household will want to save some of its temporarily higher
income so that it can spread the consumption beneﬁts over a longer period
of time. An important distinction here is between spending on durable ver-
sus nondurable goods. A lottery winner may in fact pour a large bulk of his
or her winnings into the purchase of durable goods. But such expenditures
bear a similarity to savings, because durable goods provide beneﬁts to their
owner over an extended period of time, and the key thing about consumption
smoothing is that the individual will want to use a temporary rise in income
to generate consumption beneﬁts that last over a long time period. This logic
works on the other side as well, when a household faces a temporary income
shortfall but expects to have higher income in the future. Such a household182 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
will want to keep its consumption up by drawing down savings or borrowing
against those future increases in income.
The desire for smooth consumption over time can be explained by
economists’ usual assumption of diminishing marginal utility. This simply
means that the less someone has consumed of a good or of goods and services
ingeneral, themoreeagerheorsheistoincreaseconsumption. So, ifahouse-
hold has a low income today but expects a higher income in the future, it faces
the prospect of having less consumption today than in the future. According
to diminishing marginal utility, the household would be eager to give up some
of its consumption in the relatively abundant future for a little more in the
present.
The same characteristic of people’s preferences for consumption that
makes them prefer smooth consumption over time also makes them dislike
facing risk to their consumption opportunities. That is, diminishing marginal
utility of consumption implies that people are risk averse and will be willing
to take costly actions or purchase costly insurance to avoid risk.
So the usual assumptions about consumer preferences imply that house-
holds will typically desire a smooth consumption path even as their incomes
varyovertime. Thetwomainsourcesofincomevariationarelife-cycleeffects
and the effects of shocks to an individual’s ability to earn income. To a large
extent,thelife-cyclepatternofincomeispredictable. Laborincomerisesfrom
young adulthood to middle age, reaches a peak in the 45-54 age range, and
then falls. Smoothing consumption over this pattern of income would usually
imply borrowing (or drawing down savings) when young, paying off debt and
accumulating savings in the peak earning years, and using those savings for
consumption in the later years.
Shocks to a household’s income come in two forms. Some shocks are
speciﬁc to an individual household. Prolonged illness of a wage earner, for
instance, can limit a household’s earning ability. This sort of speciﬁc uncer-
tainty in income is referred to as idiosyncratic. Other shocks affect larger
groups of people. Swings in employment caused by decline of an industry
or by the ups and downs of the business cycle affect the incomes of many
households. That is, some income ﬂuctuations are associated with aggregate
risk. Financialmarketsaremoreeffectiveathelpingpeoplesmoothconsump-
tion against idiosyncratic shocks than against systematic or aggregate shocks.
In fact, if ﬁnancial markets worked perfectly, then people would be able to
completely protect themselves against idiosyncratic shocks. Similarly, com-
pleteandwell-functioningﬁnancialmarketswouldallowpeopletosmoothout
theirlifetimevariationinincome,sincethisislargelypredictable. Inthiscase,
the only ﬂuctuations in consumption would be those arising from aggregate
income risk.
Inperfectﬁnancialmarkets,inadditiontocaseswherestandardsavingand
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of contracts that would allow them to insure against any speciﬁc event that
mightcauseadisruptiontotheirincomes. Butﬁnancialmarketsarenotperfect,
and there are limitations to households’abilities to smooth their consumption,
even against idiosyncratic or life-cycle income ﬂuctuations. Households and
other market participants face an array of constraints on the types of ﬁnancial
contracts available for managing income risk. Some of these constraints have
to do with information. Lenders typically cannot perfectly screen borrowers
according to their likelihood or propensity to default. It is also difﬁcult to
monitor the behavior of borrowers once they have taken a loan. Other con-
straints have to do with the costs of enforcing contracts. Bankruptcy laws, for
instance, limit the options available to a lender if a borrower defaults. These
constraints have two kinds of effects. First, they limit the extent of speciﬁc
insurance against income ﬂuctuations that households can receive, making
saving and borrowing the main means of consumption smoothing for many
households. Second, the constraints tend to raise the costs of borrowing and
placeupperlimitsontheamountofdebtanygivenhouseholdcanaccumulate.
Sowhilethebankruptcyoptionactuallyfacilitatesconsumptionsmoothingfor
households that have fallen on hard enough times—by releasing them from
some debt payment obligations—the more general effect of bankruptcy laws
and other credit market constraints is to increase the cost of borrowing and to
therefore limit opportunities to smooth consumption.
AsFigure1clearlyshows,thelargestpartofhouseholddebtisthatusedto
ﬁnancehousing. Thisspeciﬁcuseofcreditisquitesimilartothegeneraluseof
credit for consumption smoothing purposes, since the purchase of a home—a
verylumpytransaction—allowsthehouseholdtoconsumeasmoothstreamof
housing services. And while constraints associated with limited information
and enforcement costs place limits on a household’s unsecured borrowing
capacity, such limitations are less stringent when borrowing is collateralized,
as in the case of mortgage credit. Collateral reduces the risk of loss for the
lender should a borrower become unable to repay a loan. Similarly, a portion
of nonmortgage consumer credit is used to purchase cars and other durable
goods. Much of this credit is tied directly to—that is, secured by—the items
purchased. Still, the fastest growing part of nonmortgage credit, especially
since the 1990s, has been unsecured borrowing.
3. THINKINGABOUT CHANGES IN CREDIT
MARKETS—CAUSES
Figure 1 showed how consumers’ use of credit has grown over time. This
growth could be the result of a number of factors. One possibility is changes
in the rate of income growth. Remember that in the most basic description of
consumptionbehavior,ahouseholdwillseektoperfectlysmoothitsconsump-
tion over time. This means that a household expecting a growing income will184 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
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borrow against future income to even out its consumption expenditures. The
amount that a household will want to borrow will depend on how rapidly it
expects its income to grow. So the total amount of borrowing done by house-
holdsinaneconomymightbeexpectedtodependontheanticipatedgrowthin
income. This logic—faster anticipated income growth makes people willing
to take on more debt—carries over to the case where ﬁnancial markets (and
therefore consumption smoothing) are not perfect.
There have, in fact, been several swings in average income growth in the
United States in the last 50 years. Figure 2, for instance, shows real GDP
per capita. Of particular note is an extended period of slow growth around
1980, with a pickup in growth beginning around 1984 and continuing to the
present, with two brief interruptions for the recessions of the early 1990s and
the early 2000s. This latter period of faster income growth roughly coincides
with the period of greatest growth in household debt-to-income ratios. And
debtgrowthwasbasicallyﬂatduringtheextendedperiodofstagnatingincome
growth.J.A. Weinberg: Borrowing by U.S. Households 185
People’sbeliefsabouttheirfutureincomeprospectsareonedeterminantof
thedemandforcredit. Demandcouldalsobeaffectedbyvariabilityofincome.
Given the limitations to ﬁnancial arrangements that result from information
and enforcement constraints, saving and borrowing constitute the main tool
used by households to smooth consumption in the face of income risk. A
household will feel well-prepared to deal with shocks to its income if it has a
pool of savings to draw on or if it is conﬁdent that it will have ample access
to credit. So, if a household faces an upper limit on how much credit it will
receivefromﬁnancialinstitutions, itwillwanttomakesureitstaysfarenough
away from that upper limit so that hitting the limit in the event of a reduction
in income would be unlikely. If income risk increases—if income becomes
more variable—the household will want to increase this cushion between its
borrowings and its debt limit.
Evidence examined by Dirk Krueger and Fabrizio Perri suggests that in-
come risk faced by households has increased since 1980, implying a rising
possibility of running up against limits on debt capacity.5 This change could
have been a force for lessening household demand for borrowing, perhaps
partially offsetting the increase in demand that is likely to have come from
faster income growth. On the other hand, Krueger and Perri argue that rising
income risk could actually increase a household’s borrowing capacity. Their
argument follows from the assumption that, following default on a loan, a
household’s access to credit would be sharply reduced. Rising income risk
makeslosingaccesstocreditmorecostlyandthereforecouldmakeaborrower
less likely to default. Knowing that a borrower is less likely to default makes
a lender more willing to lend. So the effects of rising income risk on overall
household borrowing are uncertain. But there are other factors affecting both
demand and supply that could be at work in U.S. credit markets.
Themake-upofhouseholdconsumptionamonghousingservices, durable
goods, and nondurable goods is one additional demand-side factor that could
affect household borrowing. Since homes and durable goods are quite typ-
ically purchased with credit, an increase in consumers’ relative demand for
these goods could well be associated with an increase in borrowing. Some
evidence in favor of this factor appeared earlier in this essay. As previously
mentioned, rising homeownership and rising home values relative to income
are at least suggestive of an increase in the relative demand for housing.
Also on the demand side, a household’s willingness to borrow could be
affected by its perceptions about the consequences of default. In the United
States, defaulting borrowers can seek the protection of the bankruptcy law,
which allows them to either reschedule their payments to their creditors (un-
der Chapter 13 of the bankruptcy code) or dismiss their debts in exchange for
5 See Krueger and Perri (2005).186 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
surrendering their assets, above a personal exemption (under Chapter 7, with
exemptions determined at the state level). Some observers have argued that
a greater propensity to ﬁle for bankruptcy is evidence of consumers seeing
default as less costly than in the past and is one cause of rising consumer
indebtedness. This is often discussed in terms of a sense of stigma that house-
holds may feel when ﬁling for bankruptcy. The argument is that stigma, a
psychic cost of default, has declined over time, perhaps for cultural reasons
notdirectlyrelatedtocreditmarketconditions. Suchadeclineoftheperceived
costs of default would make a household more willing to borrow at a given
interest rate.
But the effect that a decline in stigma or in other costs of default has on
borrowing amounts is at least muted because of the effect this change would
have on lenders and the price of credit. Borrowers who increase their debt
because they do not mind defaulting increase the risk faced by lenders, and
lenders,inturn,willhavetoraisetheirinterestratesinordertocompensatefor
this increase in risk. This rise in interest rates will tend to reduce borrowing,
especiallybythosewhoconsiderthemselvesunlikelytodefault. Infact,Kartik
Athreya has shown that the overall effect of declining stigma would likely be
a decline in total borrowing.6
There could also be factors on the supply side of credit markets that con-
tributed to a period of rising debt among U.S. households. In particular,
technological improvements have reduced the costs to lenders of evaluating
borrowersandmanagingexposurestodefaultrisks. Thistypeofchangewould
amount to a reduction of the overall cost of lending and would thereby lead to
an increase in the supply of credit. This increase in supply would show up in
a reduction in the ﬁnancial intermediary’s “spread” between the interest paid
to retail savers and the rate charged on loans.
Ofcourse,theﬁnancialintermediarythatmakestheloanisnottheultimate
supply of funds to a borrower. Rather funds originate with the savings of
other households or businesses. And the funds could come from within the
samecountryorfromabroad. Inrecentyears, fundsfromothercountrieshave
indeedbeenamajorsourceofsupplyforU.S.creditmarkets. Eventhoughthe
bulk of this foreign investment is the purchase of government securities, these
transactions do constitute an increase in the total amount of funds ﬂowing
into U.S. ﬁnancial markets, which could translate into an easing of credit
conditions for borrowing households.
Interpretingevidenceoninterestratesorspreadsovertimeismadedifﬁcult
by another trend in the pricing of loans. There is an increasing tendency of
lenders to differentiate their lending terms based on borrower characteristics
thatareassociatedwithdefaultrisk. Inthe1980s,consumerlenders,especially
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forunsecureddebtlikecreditcardborrowings,usuallysetasingleinterestrate
at which they lent to all acceptable borrowers. Lenders then used relatively
rough evaluations of borrower-default risk to determine who got credit.
Advances in credit scoring and other techniques allow lenders to estimate
borrowers’ default risk in a more precise way than was possible in the past,
making it easier to offer different prices to borrowers, depending on their
risk characteristics. This change has differing effects on the various types of
borrowers. Very low-risk borrowers probably beneﬁt, as they pay an interest
ratethatmorecloselyreﬂectstheirrisklevel. Ontheotherendofthespectrum,
high-riskborrowers,whopreviouslywerescreenedoutofaccesstocredit,also
beneﬁt by ﬁnding their ability to borrow enhanced. Borrowers in the middle,
ontheotherhand,couldbehurtbyamovefromuniformtodifferentialpricing
of credit. These in-between borrowers may have beneﬁted in the past from
interest rates that averaged them in with lower-risk borrowers. The effects on
differenttypesofborrowersofincreaseduseofdifferentialpricingaredetailed
by Wendy Edelberg.7 Still, the technological change that makes differential
pricing more practical is the same change that lowers the overall costs of
lending, making it likely that many, if not most types of borrowers, have seen
either a reduction in the cost of borrowing or an increase in access to credit.
Another change on the supply side of credit markets that would have
effects similar to declining costs of lending is an increase in the degree of
competition among lenders. If competition is weak, then lenders are able
to set interest rate margins at levels that more than compensate for risk and
the costs of lending. Many descriptions of the credit card lending market
describe it as having relatively weak competition in the 1980s.8 The structure
of the credit card market has changed considerably since then, with many
observers concluding that increased competition has put downward pressure
oninterestratespreads. Competitionappearstohaveincreasedinthemortgage
lending market as well, where consumers are increasingly able to search over
anationwidepoolofpotentiallenders, ratherthanbeingrestrictedtoasmaller
set of local ﬁrms. Falling average costs of borrowing, from a combination
of improved technology and increased competition, appears to be a major
contributing factor to the expansion of consumer credit.9
7 Edelberg (2003).
8A notable example is Ausubel (1991).
9Athreya (2004) examines alternative sources of rising credit and ﬁnds a strong case for
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4. THINKINGABOUT CHANGES IN CREDIT
MARKETS—CONSEQUENCES
Changes in credit market conditions shift the demand or supply of credit,
resulting in changes in the amount of borrowing done by households. The
data show clearly that the net effect of these changes in recent decades has
been to increase borrowing relative to income. But to evaluate these changes,
we would like to have a sense of how they affected the overall economic
well-being of the typical household. Some of the changes discussed in the
previous section were supply changes that have the effect of reducing the cost
of borrowing. These changes enhance households’ ability to smooth their
consumption and are therefore likely to make the average household better
off.
Whenanincreaseinborrowingisdrivenbyincreasesindemandforcredit,
the effect on a household’s well-being depends on the reasons for the increase
in demand. For instance, a temporary increase in borrowing could result from
adisruptiontoahousehold’sincome. Whiletheuseofcreditallowsthehouse-
hold to respond efﬁciently to the disruption, the rise in borrowing in such an
instance is occurring as the household is becoming worse off. So, a short-
lived surge in borrowing could be an indicator of households experiencing
some ﬁnancial stress. But the evidence reviewed in this essay deals more with
asustainedriseinborrowing. Asdiscussedpreviously,thedemand-sidefactor
most likely to be associated with such a sustained increase is rising expecta-
tions of income growth. In this case, increased debt would be associated with
improving economic well-being.
Given that a main motivation in households’use of credit is smoothing of
consumption,onewaytoassesstheimpactofcreditexpansionistoaskwhether
this expansion has facilitated consumption smoothing. The previous section
noted evidence studied by Krueger and Perri that points to rising income





The fact that the typical household’s welfare improves with a sustained
expansion of credit does not mean that such a trend creates no problems or
difﬁculties. Mostimportantly,theforgoingdiscussionassumesthathousehold
decisionmaking is well-informed by the relevant facts and based on sound
analysis of the costs and beneﬁts of credit. While this may be a reasonable
assumptionforenoughhouseholdstomakeourconclusionaboutthe“average”
householdvalid,theremaywellbehouseholdswhosedecisionsareimprudent,
na¨ ıve, or based on faulty analysis. This may be particularly true in a period
whencredituseisgrowingrelativelyrapidly. First,aperiodofcreditexpansion
may be a period when the number of new and inexperienced borrowers isJ.A. Weinberg: Borrowing by U.S. Households 189
particularly high, and such borrowers may be more likely to make mistakes
in their ﬁnancial decisions. Second, if the growth of credit is associated with
the introduction of new credit instruments or new ways of pricing credit, even
some more experienced borrowers may not fully appreciate the implications
of their decisions under the new arrangements.
If credit market changes leave some consumers relatively uninformed
aboutthechoicestheyface, thenthesechangescouldalsocreateopportunities
forsomeprovidersofcreditservicestoexploitconsumers’lackofknowledge.
It should, therefore, not be surprising to see periods of rapid credit growth
coincide with increased instances and allegations of abusive practices. One
particular area of change and growth in credit markets in the last 15 years
has been in subprime lending. Products and practices in the subprime market
haveexpandedthesetofconsumerswithaccesstocredit,meaningtheaverage
subprime borrower is even more likely to be an inexperienced borrower than
the average borrower overall. So, in recent years we have seen rising public
concern regarding potentially predatory lending, or abusive practices in the
subprime lending market.
Of course, even for borrowers who are capable of evaluating their credit
market opportunities and making well-informed decisions, outcomes are not
always positive. A consumer may face unanticipated expenses or changes in
income that limit the ability to service debt, leading to default, bankruptcy, or
foreclosure on a mortgaged home. And it is often hard to know, after the fact,
whether a distressed borrower made a sound ﬁnancial decision at the time a
loan was originally taken out. So distinguishing those who were victimized
from those who were careless and from those who were just unlucky is not
always possible.
The growth in bad outcomes from borrowing, a trend that follows from
thegeneralgrowthintheuseofcredit, canbeadrivingforceforproponentsof
a public policy response to credit market phenomena. As more borrowers ﬁnd
themselvesexperiencingdifﬁculties,sentimentemergesforpoliciesthatcould
keep consumers out of credit-induced ﬁnancial trouble. With such policies
tendingtobeaimedatprotectingborrowersoflowandmoderatemeans,alook
at the relevant facts regarding credit use by households of different income
levels may prove useful.
5. BORROWING TRENDSACROSS THE INCOME
DISTRIBUTION
The data presented in Figure 1 provide a picture of the borrowing behavior
of the entire household sector. That is, these data might be thought of as
reﬂective of the average household in the United States. These trends appear
to be explained by the supply and demand factors discussed in the previous
section. But as was mentioned before, changes in credit market conditions190 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
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do not affect all households in the same way. In particular, the uses and con-
sequences of debt may differ among households at different income levels.
Figure 3 presents information on household borrowing trends across the in-
come distribution. These data are drawn from the Federal Reserve Board’s
SCF, which is conducted every three years, with the most recent data coming
from the 2001 survey.10 The data from this source do not stretch back as far
as the aggregate data, but they do include the period of rapid credit growth in
the 1990s.
The ﬁve graphs in the ﬁgure show the growth in median debt-to-income
ratios for the second, third, and fourth income quintiles and for the top two
income deciles. In broad terms, the trends for different income quintiles look
similar to the aggregate, with debt-to-income ratios rising steadily through
the 1990s. In percentage terms, this growth was the most pronounced for the
group between the 20th and 39th percentiles, which registered a 290 percent
10At the time this Report was in production, the 2004 SCF results had not yet been released.J.A. Weinberg: Borrowing by U.S. Households 191
increase, albeit from a very low base. By contrast, the median debt-to-income
ratio among the wealthiest households—the top quintile—rose by 48 percent.
Thepoorestconsumers—thoseinthelowestincomequintile—aremissing
in Figure 3. This is because the ﬁgure shows median debt to income for each
quintile, and throughout this period, fewer than half of all households in the
lowest quintile had any debt. If we were to plot, instead, the median ratio in
each quintile only for those households with debt, the lowest quintile would
lookmoresimilartotheothers. Doingthisleavesoutgrowthindebtthatcomes
from increased participation in credit markets and measures only the extent to
which borrowing increased by people who were already borrowing. Among
households having at least some debt, debt-to-income ratios grew fastest—78
percent growth from 1989 to 2001—for households in the lowest quintile.
At the same time, the fraction of low- and moderate-income households with
debt increased during this period. This rate of “participation” in taking on
debt increased in all income groups below the median, with the fastest growth
coming in the second lowest quintile.
The predominance of debt-to-income growth among households in the
lowerpartoftheincomedistributionraisesquestionsaboutwhetherthecauses
or consequences of growing credit use among these households are different
than for households at or above the median income level. As described in
Section 3, there are both demand and supply factors that have contributed
to the growing use of credit among U.S. households. On the demand side,
a major determinant of borrowing is a household’s expectations of income
growth. The growth of the aggregate use of credit in the 1990s lines up
well with a pickup in income growth during that period. But income growth
was uneven, with income inequality expanding. That is, the acceleration of
incomegrowthoccurredmoreforhigher-incomehouseholds. Sothisdemand-
side factor might not have been as important for the growth of borrowing by
low-income households.
On the supply side, the main factors increasing debt have been improve-
ments in technology that allow improved underwriting practices and a move
to greater sensitivity of prices depending on borrowers’ risk characteristics.
Both of these factors are likely to have improved ﬁnancial markets’ and in-
stitutions’ ability to bear the risks associated with lending to lower-income
households. The greater variability of pricing, in particular, is likely to have
helped expand credit to households that previously would have been rationed
out of the credit market. This effect may be reﬂected in the growth in the
fraction of low-income households that hold credit.
To the extent that growing credit use among low-income households is
being driven by growth in the number of borrowers, it is likely that this ex-
pansion has brought new, inexperienced borrowers into the market. This is
consistent with the direction of much of the recent discussion about consumer
credit policy.192 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
6. POLICY RESPONSES TO CHANGES IN CREDIT MARKETS
There are three broad types of policy approaches to limiting ﬁnancial difﬁ-
culties for borrowers. First, one can imagine policies aimed at the problem
of borrowers being uninformed about ﬁnancial choices. Second, policies that
seek to identify and punish instances of abuse by lenders could provide some
protection to borrowers. Finally, regulators could try to place limits on the
terms and prices that lenders can offer in the marketplace.
Effortstoraiseconsumers’understandingofﬁnancialchoiceshavegained
considerable attention recently. There are two broad sets of tools that serve
this goal. One can require disclosures by lenders with the aim of ensuring that
consumers can easily compare alternative credit options. This is the approach
taken under the truth in lending laws. It is not always easy to summarize all of
therelevantconditionsinacreditcontractwithafewsimplenumbers,however.
As the variety of terms and conditions available in the market continues to
expand, there may be a limit to how much disclosures alone can enhance
consumer knowledge.
The other avenue to creating better informed consumers is through the
provision of ﬁnancial literacy services. Credit counseling is one form of such
services, and the 2005 bankruptcy legislation included counseling from an
approved nonproﬁt provider as a precondition for bankruptcy ﬁling. The act
also provides for the development of postﬁling educational materials. There
hasalsobeenmovementinsomestatestorequireﬁnancialliteracycurriculain
public primary and secondary schools. Some ﬁnancial institutions and trade
associations have become directly involved in the development of ﬁnancial
literacy programs, perhaps as an investment in their public image, but also
perhaps because many banks see better informed customers as a legitimate
business goal.
What exactly is it that consumers should learn from ﬁnancial education?
Thegoal,presumably,isforahouseholdtobeabletomakeinformed,forward-
looking choices with regard to the use of credit instruments. But being able to
fully calculate the expected present value of different options may be beyond
the reach of many consumers. Retail credit products are not simple ﬁnancial
contracts. They often involve provisions that amount to options for either
the borrower or the lender. Such options might be explicit in the contract,
like the option to prepay a mortgage, or implicit, like the option to ﬁle for
bankruptcy. Accurately evaluating options is difﬁcult, even for the ﬁnancially
sophisticated. Perhapsonerealisticgoalofﬁnancialeducationisforborrowers
to appreciate that if one credit alternative has a lower initial monthly payment
thananother,thenitisprobablymorecostlyonanotherdimension. Borrowers
who can understand such trade-offs are less likely to make choices that have
a high chance of negative outcomes.
A by-product of raising the level of ﬁnancial savvy among borrowers is
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Still,therewillalwaysbeinstancesofsuchbehavior,andeffectivelawenforce-
ment is an important supplement to a well-informed population of borrowers.
Prosecution of speciﬁc acts, however, is difﬁcult and costly, leading some
to advocate credit market regulations that prohibit certain practices that are
believed to be particularly susceptible to abuse. The prospect of prohibiting
speciﬁc contractual terms presents a difﬁcult trade-off. Such a prohibition
may effectively prevent some instances of bad outcomes such as defaults,
foreclosures, or bankruptcies. And some of those instances would undoubt-
edly represent cases where it was probably not in the borrower’s best interest
to take out a loan with the particular terms. Some would be the result of
borrowers simply making mistakes, and some would arise from lenders being
deceptiveormanipulative. Butsomecasesofbadoutcomeswouldresulteven
for borrowers making sound, well-informed choices. For those, the particular
credit contract was the best option at the time they borrowed.
A prohibition of a particular practice limits some households’ ability to
manage their ﬁnances and consumption. So such a regulatory approach to
credit market behavior necessarily protects some borrowers at the expense of
others. Still, one could argue that such a policy is warranted if it were the case
that the group that would be helped is much larger than the group that would
be hurt, or if the amount by which some are helped signiﬁcantly exceeds the
amount by which others are hurt. But the type of data necessary to make
this kind of determination is very hard to come by. To fully understand the
overall impact on borrowers of a particular lending practice and to assess the
likely effect of prohibiting it, one would want to take a look at a sample of
households, some who used the product in question and some who did not.
Bytrackingthatsampleforaconsiderableperiod, bothbeforeandaftertaking
on the loan, one would reveal the average determinants of using the product
together with its impact.
Without such detailed data, the regulatory prohibition of lending prac-
tices should be viewed very cautiously. The general description provided in
this essay of the economics of and trends in household credit suggests that,
on the whole, the growth of credit we have observed in recent decades has
been beneﬁcial for consumers, providing them with an expanded set of op-
tions for managing their lifetime consumption. And this observation points
to an important principle for evaluating changes in credit markets, whether
those changes are in the form of new products or new regulations. The deci-
sion to borrow is inherently a forward-looking decision. Households borrow
to align their consumption today, as well as their holdings of housing and
durable goods, with their beliefs about their consumption possibilities in the
future. Accordingly, the appropriate perspective in evaluating the addition or
elimination of a credit product is from the point in time at which a household
is making a borrowing choice. Is a household made better off or worse off
by having access to this product? Adopting this perspective does not mean194 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
that one should ignore the bad outcomes that result from use of the product.
It means, instead, that one should think of those bad outcomes as part of a
distribution of possible outcomes and ask whether this distribution presents
the household, on average, with better consumption opportunities than would
be available without the product. Without the data necessary to evaluate the
distribution of outcomes, we are left simply knowing that the elimination of a
particular credit product may help some but hurt others. Simply knowing that
there is a trade-off is a ﬁrst step, but a small step on the way to policy analysis.
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